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1 
Of Guilds and Men: 




The motion picture industry utilizes a varied collection of more or 
less formal mechanisms for dealing with the collective nature of 
audiovisual works, ranging from collective bargaining to legal 
presumptions.  What these instances of copyright workarounds have 
in common is that they are all about circumventing traditional notions 
of authorship (the right to be deemed the author of a work) and 
ownership (the right to exert control over a work).  When considered 
from an international perspective, the cinematographic industry is 
fertile ground for an exploration of such mechanisms. 
 
After a recitation of the Berne Convention, this paper will 
proceed to discuss countries where the Berne Convention has been 
applied to audiovisual works with drastically different results: France 
and the United States.  From there it will retrace the history of the so-
called Foreign Levies Agreement.  This agreement illustrates the 
collision of the French and American copyright workarounds.  It was 
born from, inter alia, a dispute between the Directors’ Guild of 
America (DGA), the Writers’ Guild of America (WGA) and several 
movie producers upon the collection and distribution of foreign levies 
to American authors.  This study will then discuss the contractual 
* Lecturer, John Molson School of Business, Concordia University. LL.D. Candidate
(Université de Montréal).I would like to thank Daniel Gervais, Patrick Goudreau, Jason 
R. Sowards, Michèle Leroux, Saleha Hedaraly, Frédéric Grotino and Neil Scotten for their
help at earlier stages of this work. I am also grateful for research assistance from Jean-
François R. Ouellette. All remaining errors are mine.The masculine form is used strictly in 
order to alleviate this text, and is intended to address both men and women.
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“So when people ask why we writers call ourselves ‘labor,’ the 
easiest answer is that we don’t—the companies do.  They demand 
that we be employees so that they can reap the full benefits of 
copyright exploitation, and that’s fine.  Honestly.”1
Our tale will start at the end of the story. 
 
More precisely, our tale will start with the credits.  TV series, 
documentaries, motion pictures, and animations all share one 
characteristic: after a long litany of names, they close with a statement 
regarding copyright.  Such statements can take many forms and 
1. Craig Mazin, Who strikes? ‘Labor’ Because Studios Say So, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2007), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-op-dustup10dec10,0,4285139.story. 
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shapes, but boil down to one main principle: whoever invested in the 
movie intends to obtain protection of their investment. 
Julie Cohen contends that copyright “creates a foundation for 
predictability in the organization of cultural production, something 
particularly important in capital-intensive industries like film 
production.”2
The motion picture industry, when considered from an 
international perspective, is fertile ground for an exploration of such 
copyright workarounds.  From collective bargaining to legal 
presumptions, it presents a varied collection of more or less formal 
mechanisms dealing with the collective nature of audiovisual works. 
What these instances of copyright workaround have in common is 
that they are all about circumventing traditional notions of authorship 
(the right to be deemed the author of a work) and ownership (the 
right to exert control over a work). 
  The story we will unfold will prove her both right and 
wrong.  It is true that predictability is a sought-after side effect of 
copyright.  However, it is also true that the structure of the 
international copyright system can defeat the best prepared.  The 
parties concerned will, in turn, seek solutions around and outside 
copyright to devise sound and foreseeable legal constructs. 
I. A (Not so Brief) Introduction
This introduction will open with a reminder of the Berne 
Convention and proceed to countries where the Berne Convention 
has been applied to audiovisual works with drastically different 
results: France and the United States.  Part II will then retrace the 
history of the so-called Foreign Levies Agreement born from, inter 
alia, the discrepancies between the French and American copyright 
laws.  From there, Part III will delineate underlying issues of 
collective action in this context. 
A. The Berne Convention
Article 5 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works3
2. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research 
Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143 (2011). 
 ensures that a foreign author based in a signatory 
3. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art 5, Sept. 9,
1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 (Paris Act of July 24, 1971, as amended on September 28, 1979) 
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. Article 5 provides that: 
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country can claim the same copyright protection as local authors, 
whether or not he enjoys protection in his own country.  For example, 
since both the United States and France signed the Berne 
Convention,4
In addition to granting protection to foreign authors, the Berne 
Convention provides for minimum protection standards.
 an American right-holder whose works are exploited in 
France can claim the same rights as French right-holders in France. 
5
“(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected 
under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country 
of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter 
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this 
Convention. 
Consequently, signatory countries are free to increase copyright 
protection through any mechanism of their liking.  Therefore, the 
protection regimes for a given right can drastically vary from one 
State to another.  This is precisely the case for ownership in motion 
pictures.  Article 14 bis (2)(a) of the Berne Convention states that 
“ownership of copyright in a cinematographic work shall be a matter 
(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the
existence of protection in the country of origin of the work.
Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of
protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to
protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country
where protection is claimed.
(3) Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law. However,
when the author is not a national of the country of origin of the work for
which he is protected under this Convention, he shall enjoy in that
country the same rights as national authors (...).”
4. France signed the Berne Convention on September 9, 1886 and ratified it on
September 5, 1887. The treaty entered into force on December 5, 1887. The United States 
joined the Berne Convention on November 16, 1988. The treaty came into force on March 
1, 1989. For an up-to-date list of signatory countries of the Berne Convention, see 
Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Sept. 
27, 2012). 
5. Berne Convention, supra note 3, at 19: “The provisions of this Convention shall
not preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater protection which may be 
granted by legislation in a country of the Union.” See also id. at 20: “The Governments of 
the countries of the Union reserve the right to enter into special agreements among 
themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those 
granted by the Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to this Convention. 
The provisions of existing agreements which satisfy these conditions shall remain 
applicable.” 
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for legislation in the country where protection is claimed.” 6 
Furthermore, the Berne Convention does not contain provisions 
regarding employers and employees.  In short, signatory countries are 
free to craft specific authorship rules for motion pictures, and to 
assign ownership to whomever they see fit.7
B. Implementation of the Berne Convention
 
Gérard Lyon-Caen notes there are two dominant conceptions of
authorship in cinematographic works, which in turn impact the 
determination of ownership.8  On one side, some countries prefer a 
creator-based approach. 9   On the other side, other countries 
emphasize the economic aspects of cinematographic production and 
vest copyright in the producer.10  This paper will limit its illustration to 
one example of each school of thought, starting with French copyright 
law as an example of the physical-person centered droit d’auteur 
system11
6. SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 128 (2d ed. 2006), 
stating that “[t]he inclusion of cinematographic works under the umbrella of the Berne 
Convention had long been the cause of considerable difficulty, both from a doctrinal and a 
practical point of view…  Accordingly, there were many national differences in the 
treatment of cinematographical works, particularly in relation to the questions of 
authorship and ownership...The result was the adoption of a new conventional regime 
governing cinematographic works. This was embodied in article 14, which dealt with the 
rights of authors with respect to cinematographic reproduction and adaptations of their 
works, and a new article 14 bis, which dealt with rights in the cinematographic works 
themselves and the exploitation of these rights.” About the 1967 Stockholm Revision 
Conference, see generally id. at 120.   
, and continuing with the American example of a producer-
oriented copyright system. 
7. Id. at 7.32.
8. Gérard Lyon-Caen, Le cinéma dans la Convention de Berne (Bureau 
international pour la protection des oeuvres littéraires et artistiques, 1960) at 9. See also 
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 6, at 365. 
9. Lyon-Caen,  supra note 8, at 11.
10. Id. at 10 (noting that this approach is not limited to copyright countries).
11. For a thorough study of the French framework for audiovisual works, see
CHRISTINE HUGON, LE RÉGIME DE L’OEUVRE AUDIOVISUELLE (Litec, 1993). 
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1. The French System: Presumptions as a Workaround
a. Attribution of Authorship
Article 14 of the French Loi n°57-298 du 11 mars 1957 sur la
propriété littéraire et artistique 12 (hereafter Loi du 11 mars 1957) 
introduced a presumption of authorship benefiting a list of physical 
persons involved in the making of the audiovisual work, 13  now 
codified in article L. 113-7 C.P.I..14  It specifies that the physical 
person who directed the work is regarded as its author, and that the 
author of the script, the author of the adaptation, the author of the 
dialogue, the author of the soundtrack composed for the work, and 
the director are to be considered as authors in the absence of proof to 
the contrary.15
This position is consistent with article 14 bis (2) of the Berne 
Convention as well as with the European legal environment.
 
16
12. Loi n°57-298 du 11 mars 1957 sur la propriété littéraire et artistique, JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, [J.O.], 14 March 1957, p. 2723 [hereinafter 
Loi du 11 mars 1957].  
 
13. For a detailed analysis of the presumption mechanism, see HENRI DESBOIS, LE 
DROIT D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE 147-61 (Dalloz, 3d ed. 1978). 
14. Loi n° 92-597 du 1er juillet 1992 relative au code de la propriété intellectuelle,
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, [J.O.] 3 July 1992, p. 8801 
[hereinafter Loi du 1er juillet 1992].   
15. L. 113-7 C.P.I. :“Ont la qualité d’auteur d’une oeuvre audiovisuelle la ou les
personnes physiques qui réalisent la création intellectuelle de cette oeuvre. 
Sont présumés, sauf preuve contraire, coauteurs d’une oeuvre audiovisuelle réalisée 
en collaboration : 1° L’auteur du scénario ; 2° L’auteur de l’adaptation ; 3° L’auteur du 
texte parlé ; 4° L’auteur des compositions musicales avec ou sans paroles spécialement 
réalisées pour l’oeuvre ; 5° Le réalisateur. 
Lorsque l’oeuvre audiovisuelle est tirée d’une oeuvre ou d’un scénario préexistants 
encore protégés, les auteurs de l’oeuvre originaire sont assimilés aux auteurs de l’oeuvre 
nouvelle” (emphasis added).  
For a discussion of the choice of authors, see HUGON, supra note 12, at 97-103. For an 
empirical study of authors’ remuneration for TV broadcasting in France, see Françoise 
Benhamou and Stéphanie Peltier, Le droit d’auteur, incitation à la création ou frein à la 
diffusion ? Une analyse empirique du cas de la création télévisuelle 135:3 REVUE 
D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 47, 51, 58 (2011). 
16. The WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, was approved by
the European Community, see Council Decision of 16 March 2000 on the Approval, on 
Behalf of the European Community, of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty 2000/278/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 89) 6.  Article 1(4) of the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty provides that contracting parties are to comply with articles 1 to 
21 of the Berne Convention. 
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Indeed, in its recent Luksan decision,17 the European Court of Justice 
restated the European Community position on this question.  In 1992, 
article 2(2) of Directive 92/100/EEC on Rental Right and Lending 
Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of 
Intellectual Property provided that, “for the purposes of this 
Directive, the principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual 
work shall be considered as its author or one of its authors.  Member 
States may provide for others to be considered as its co-authors.”18 
This principle has been reaffirmed in subsequent pieces of 
legislation.19
b. Attribution of Ownership
 
In addition to article 14 provisions regarding authorship, article 17
of the Loi du 11 mars 1957,20 now article L. 132-24 C.P.I.,21 framed the 
exploitation of cinematographic works.  According to this article, any 
agreement between the authors and the producer automatically 
transfers to the producer all exclusive exploitation rights, meaning full 
control save a few exceptions.22
17. Martin Luksan v. Petrus van der Let, Case C-277/10, Feb. 9, 2012,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119322&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=415563 (last visited Oct 15, 2012). 
  For example, the director’s rights are 
18. Now replaced by article 2(2) of EC, Directive 2006/115/EC of 12 December 2006
on Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field 
of Intellectual Property, 2006 O.J. L 376/28. 
19. Directive 93/83 of the Council of the European Communities of 27 September 1993
on the Coordination of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to 
Copyright Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L248) 
1(5). See also Directive 2006/116/EC of 12 December 2006 on the Term of Protection of 
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 2006 O.J. (L372) 2(1). 
20. Loi du 11 mars 1957, supra note 12. For a detailed analysis of article 17, see
DESBOIS, supra note 13 at 672-78. Article 17 was consolidated in article 63-1 by the Loi 
n°85-660 du 3 juillet 1985 relative aux droits d’auteur et aux droits des artistes-interprètes, 
des producteurs de phonogrammes et de vidéogrammes et des entreprises de communication 
audiovisuelle, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] 4 July 1985, p. 
7495 [hereinafter Loi du 3 juillet 1985], see ANDRÉ LUCAS ET HENRI-JACQUES LUCAS, 
TRAITÉ DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 726-31(LexisNexis, 3d. ed.  2006). 
21. Loi du 1er juillet 1992, supra note 14.
22. L. 132-24 C.P.I.: “Le contrat qui lie le producteur aux auteurs d’une oeuvre
audiovisuelle, autres que l’auteur de la composition musicale avec ou sans paroles, 
emporte, sauf clause contraire et sans préjudice des droits reconnus à l’auteur par les 
dispositions des articles L. 111-3, L. 121-4, L. 121-5, L. 122-1 à L. 122-7, L. 123-7, L. 131-2 à 
L. 131-7, L. 132-4 et L. 132-7, cession au profit du producteur des droits exclusifs
d’exploitation de l’oeuvre audiovisuelle.
Le contrat de production audiovisuelle n’emporte pas cession au producteur des 
droits graphiques et théâtraux sur l’oeuvre. 
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automatically transferred to the producer by contract, provided the 
agreement contains no clause to the contrary.  In any case, the 
contract must determine compensation for the authors, based on each 
and every use of the work,23 and has to specify, precisely and in 
writing, which elements are granted and which elements are 
withheld.24
Henri Desbois reports that the initial wording of the provision 
presented by the French Parliament was very broad.  Over the course 
of parliamentary debates, it was reduced to the rights necessary for 
the cinematographic exploitation of the audiovisual work.
 
25 
According to Desbois, the default rule in the original 1957 law only 
allowed for a very restrictive use.26  Nevertheless, the Loi n° 85-660 du 
3 juillet 1985 relative aux droits d’auteur et aux droits des artistes-
interprètes, des producteurs de phonogrammes et de vidéogrammes et 
des entreprises de communication audiovisuelle27 (hereafter Loi du 3 
juillet 1985) replaced the droit exclusif d’exploitation 
cinématographique, arguably limited to exploitation in movie 
theatres, by the droits exclusifs d’exploitation de l’oeuvre 
audiovisuelle, including all possible ways to make the movie 
available—television, cable, sale of videotapes .28
Thus, the producer, albeit not deemed the author of the work 
under French law, is able to exert full control of all the rights 
necessary for a normal exploitation of the audiovisual work.  The 
 
Ce contrat prévoit la liste des éléments ayant servi à la réalisation de l’oeuvre qui sont 
conservés ainsi que les modalités de cette conservation.” 
Article L. 132-24 CPI wording is, at best, confusing, see LUCAS & LUCAS, supra note 
20 at 726, speaking of malfaçon législative (defective legislative work). For an illustration, 
see Cass. soc., 3 mars 2004, D. 2004.2494 (Annot. Jean-Luc Piotraut and Pierre-Jean 
Dechristé), R.T.D. Com. 2004 p. 726 (Annot. Frédéric Pollaud-Dulian). 
23. L 132-25 C.P.I., formerly articles 26 and 35 of the Loi du 11 mars 1957, supra note
12, consolidated in article 63-2 by the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20. See HUGON, 
supra note 11 at 436-63. On the redundant nature of the provision, see PIERRE-YVES 
GAUTIER, PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 601, 607 (Presses Universitaires de 
France, 7th ed. 2010). 
24. HUGON, supra note 11, at 426-35. Such a mechanism is consistent with article
14bis (2) and (3) of the Berne Convention, supra note 3.  See GAUTIER, supra note 23 at 
600, 610.  See also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 6 at 386.   
25. DESBOIS, supra note 13, at 674.
26. Id., adding in note 1: “seuls, les droits dont l’exercice est nécessaire à
l’exploitation normale, sont présumés avoir été cédés (...).” 
27. Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra  note 20.
28. See LUCAS & LUCAS, supra note 20, at 728; HUGON, supra note 11, at 428.
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problem is some of the relevant rights are subject to specific rules 
restricting the authors’ ability to dispose of their rights.29
c. Mandatory Collective Management
 
The compensation regimen for private copying of analog media is
an example of these specific rules.  With the arrival of VCR, 
consumers were able to create copies at home, infringing authors’ 
exclusive right of reproduction.  The economic damages resulting 
from private copying were taken into account by article 31 of the Loi 
du 3 juillet 1985, later codified in article L. 311-1 C.P.I..30  Basically, 
the law balanced authors’ inability to properly exert their exclusive 
right31 by granting them a non-exclusive right to remuneration.  This 
compensation took the form of a fixed-rate levy on the sales of video 
tapes and other media.32
In practice, the private copying levies’ basis and rate are 
determined by the Commission sur la rémunération pour copie privée, 
an administrative tariff-setting body,
  To manage the levy, the law imposed a 
mandatory system of collective management for private copying of 
videos on blank media. 
33  and paid by blank media 
producers and importers.34  A copyright collective, the Société des 
auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques35
29. On the opacity of the remuneration system in the French motion picture industry,
see Joëlle Farchy, Caroline Rainette & Sébastien Poulain, Économies des droits d’auteur. 
II - Le cinéma, 2007:5 CULTURE ÉTUDES 1, 16 (2007). For an equivalent study for TV 
industry see Françoise Benhamou and Stéphanie Peltier, Économies des droits d’auteur. III 
- La télévision 2007:6 CULTURE ÉTUDES 1, 6-7(2007).
 (hereafter SACD), acts as an 
30. L. 311-1 C.P.I., formerly article 31 of the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20.
Despite its unclear wording, article L. 311-2 C.P.I. is to be understood as covering foreign 
right-holders as they are deemed to be French authors, see GAUTIER, supra note 23, at 280 
and 288; LUCAS & LUCAS, supra note 20, at 1147. 
31. Literally, a right to exclude, a jus prohibendi. The code recognizes the
impossibility of determining a proper basis for proportional compensation, see article 
L 131-4 C.P.I., formerly article 35 of the Loi du 11 mars 1957, supra note 13, and article 49 
of the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20. 
32. L. 311-3 C.P.I., formerly article 32 of the  Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra  note 20.
33. Id. at L. 311-5 C.P.I., formerly article 34.
34. Id. at L. 311-4 C.P.I., formerly article 33, aiming at “supports d’enregistrement
utilisables pour la reproduction à usage privé d’oeuvres fixées sur des phonogrammes ou 
des vidéogrammes.” 
35. SACD, http://www.sacd.fr/A-society-for-and-by-authors.750.0.html (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012). SACD statutes provides that: “[t]he object of the Society is: 1) The 
protection of the rights of its members with respect to all users and, in general, the 
protection of the moral and material interests of the members of the Society and that of 
the author’s profession; ... 3) Exercise and management in all countries of all the rights 
involved in performance or reproduction, in any form whatsoever, of the works of its 
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intermediary between Copie-France,36 the organization in charge of 
collecting all private copying levies related to audiovisual works, and 
the directors, screen writers, and writers.37
The provision imposing collective management for private 
copying presents a few noteworthy characteristics.  First, article 
L. 311-1 C.P.I. specifically mentions authors, whereas other
mandatory collective management schemes, such as cable
retransmission,
  Interestingly, it is not a 
voluntary collective management system.  Authors do not have to be 
members of the SACD to benefit from its collecting, clearing, and 
distributing services. 
38 aim at right-holders at large.  Second, this article
creates a non-exclusive right to compensation, as discussed above,
which by nature differs from the exclusive right covered by article
L. 132-24 C.P.I.39  Thus, it is not covered by the presumption of
transfer.  Third, article L. 311-7 C.P.I.40 specifies that, for audiovisual
works, the distribution key for the levies is of one third for authors,
one third for producers and one third for interpreters, thereby
limiting producers’ share to one third.41
members, notably the collection and distribution of the royalties derived from the exercise 
of the above rights, including within the framework of article L. 122-9 of the Code of 
Intellectual Property; 4) Pooling of part of the collected royalties...,” Statutes and General 
Regulations, SACD, 5,  http://www.sacd.fr/uploads/tx_sacdresources/statuts_eng_02.pdf. 
See also, generally, Sophie Poinsot under supervision of Hubert Tilliet, Fasc. 1570 Sociétés 
de perception et de répartition des droits - Société des auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques 
(SACD) JURIS-CLASSEUR PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE (2010).  
  For all these reasons, the
presumption of transfer created by article L. 132-24 C.P.I. does not
cover the remuneration for private copying.  Consequently, American
36. COPIE FRANCE, http://www.copiefrance.fr/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). Copie-
France is an umbrella collective gathering several copyright collectives, see COPIE-
FRANCE, Organization Chart, http://www.copiefrance.fr/l_quisommesnous_2b.htm (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2012). 
37. L. 311-6 C.P.I., formerly article 35 of the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra  note 20.
38. L. 132-20-1 C.P.I., introduced by the Loi n°97-283 du 27 mars 1997 portant
transposition dans le code de la propriété intellectuelle des directives du Conseil des 
Communautés européennes nos 93/83 du 27 septembre 1993 et 93/98 du 29 octobre 1993, 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] 28 March 1997, p.4831. 
39. It is considered as an “amputation” of the exclusive right, see GAUTIER, supra
note 23, at 279. 
40. L. 311-7 C.P.I., formerly article 36 of the Loi du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 20.
41. Gautier considers that article 14 bis 2 b) of the Berne Convention would allow an
American producer to benefit from the third allotted to producers, but not the third 
allotted to authors.  see GAUTIER, supra note 23, at 280. 
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producers cannot claim the levies collected in France for American 
motion pictures’ authors.42
Altogether, these elements demonstrate the French legislator’s 
intent to ensure the creator a fair share of the economic value of his 






In summary, the default system works as follows:
France Author Owner 
Exclusive exploitation 
rights for the audiovisual 
work 
The physical person 
who authored the 
work 
(presumed authors: 
the author of the 
script, the author of 
the adaptation, the 
author of the 
dialogues, the author 
of the soundtrack 
composed for the 





Other exclusive rights 
(adaptation, 
translation. . .) 
The physical 
person who 








authored the work 
2. The American System: Collective Bargaining as a Workaround
Contrary to the French system, the American copyright system is
producer-centered.  The idea of employer’s copyright ownership was 
first introduced in common law circa 1900,44 and became a statutory 
provision with the 1909 Copyright Act.45
42. Neither can they use the work for hire doctrine (infra note 47) since the Berne
Convention imposes French law when the protection is claimed in France. 
 
43. HUGON, supra note 11, at 202.
44. Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine 15
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 59 (2003). 
45. Id. at 62. She goes on: “The decision to label the employer an ‘author,’ rather
than create a default rule of implied automatic assignment, appears to have been based on 
three considerations. First, it was a matter of ease in statutory drafting (‘author’ is a term 
of art used throughout the statute). Second, it avoided constitutional doubts about a 
default rule of employer ownership stemming from the constitutional provision that 
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a. Authorship, Ownership and Works Made for Hire
Section 101 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976 states that
a work made for hire is: 
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as
a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work . . . if the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. . .46
As pinpointed by Catherine Fisk, “[a]ttribution of authorship is a 
matter of proof, not a process of cultural attribution, and when 
corporations are deemed authors, it is because they have hired people 
who created works.”47
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer, or other 
person for whom the work was prepared, is considered the 
author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have 
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by 
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
  Furthermore, § 201(b) adds that: 
48
In the U.S. film industry, most of all copyrightable contributions 
to a movie fall in the work made for hire category, “with the hiring 
party, usually the producer/financier, deemed both the author and the 
initial owner of the copyright in the contributions.”49  Consequently, 
“[t]he owner of any copyrighted work that is created as a work for 
hire has all the rights of copyright owners, including the right to 
decide whether to produce [the work] into a film for theatrical 
release, directly for DVD, for television, or not to produce it at all.”50
Congress may give ‘authors’ a copyright. Third, and most importantly, the drafters of the 
revision wanted to be sure that the employer would be the initial copyright owner rather 
than an assignee, because only the initial owner is entitled to obtain a renewal.” Id. 
 
46. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
47. Fisk, Authors at Work, supra note 44, at 4.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (2006).
49. F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion
Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 228 (2002). For a discussion of 
authorship in several kinds of contributions to motion pictures, see id. at  282-316. 
50. Catherine L. Fisk, The Role of Private Intellectual Property Rights in Markets for
Labor and Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild of America, 1938-2000, 32 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 215, 217 (2011). 
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b. Collective Bargaining in the Motion Picture Industry
But there is a second contractual layer of copyright attribution
superimposed on the statutory rules regarding works made for hire.  
Indeed, to counteract the very integrated Hollywood studio system,51 
artists unionized in the 1930s 52  to negotiate a legal framework 
regulating economic relationships between movie producers and 
creators, in order “to protect the status and creative control of 
writers.”53
Why were independent contractors and professionals such as 
screen-writers were allowed to unionize in the first place? In 1938, the 
American National Labor Relations Board recognized “the power of 
producers to dictate the content of writers’ work, to assign parts of 
stories, to stipulate where writers were to write.”
 
54  This recognition 
allowed screen-writers to bargain collectively on labor issues.  From 
this point, the Writers Guild of America 55  (hereafter WGA) 
concluded agreements with the Alliance of Motion Picture and 
Television Producers 56
51. Kevin Lee, ‘The Little State Department’: Hollywood and the MPAA’s Influence
on U.S. Trade Relations, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 373 (2008). “Under the studio 
system, a film studio controlled all stages of a movie’s economic life, from the birth of the 
screenplay written by a studio-employed writer to film production to final distribution in a 
studio-owned theater. …At the height of the studio system era, Hollywood produced an 
average of 400 films each year between 1930 and 1950, with a peak of 504 films 
approximately one film per week for each studio-in 1941.” Id. 
 regarding work conditions and, most 
52. For a history of the development of the guilds, see HUGH LOVELL AND TASILE 
CARTER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY: A STRUGGLE 
FOR STABILITY 34-38 (Institute of Industrial Relations at UC Berkeley ed., 1955). 
53. Fisk, Screen Credit, supra note 50 at 266.
54. Id. at 228, referring to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios and al., 7 NLRB 662
(1938). See Chester C. Ward, Discrimination under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 
YALE L. J. 1152, 1185 n.265 (1939) (the Board “rejected the argument that the Act was 
intended to protect only wage earner in the lower income brackets and hence does not 
apply to creative and professional workers payed [sic] as much as 2,000$ a week”). 
55. Actually, the first collective agreement was signed in 1940 by the Screen Writers
Guild. Several unions, including the Screen Writers Guild, merged into WGA East and 
West in 1954. see WGA, Timeline, http://www.wgaw.org/history/timeline.html (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2012). For technical reasons of no relevance for this article, WGA is actually 
composed of two unions, Writers Guild of America West, http://www.wga.org (last visited 
Sept. 28. 2012) and Writers Guild of America East, https://www.wgaeast.org (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2012). On the development of a national bargaining unit for writers, see LOVELL 
& CARTER, supra note 52 at 51. 
56. “The AMPTP, the entertainment industry’s official collective bargaining
representative, negotiates 80 industry-wide collective bargaining agreements on behalf of 
over 350 motion picture and television producers (member companies include the 
production entities of the studios, broadcast networks, certain cable networks and 
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importantly, regulating screen credits.  Today, the WGA represents 
TV and film writers and “determine[s] who is credited for writing.  
Credit determinations, in turn, affect what writers get paid…”57
As further explained by Catherine Fisk: 
 
Screen credit supports a system of revenue-sharing (residuals) 
and of unbundling the rights encompassed in a copyright 
(separated rights) that compensates writers during periods of 
slack employment, thus keeping their human capital in the 
industry.  The Guild has thus used the power it has under 
labor law as the exclusive representative of writers in 
collective negotiations with production companies to modify 
the effects of the work for hire doctrine in copyright law and 
to create a system of moral rights.58
Indeed, the WGA developed a system of authorship attribution 
by credit that has no equivalent in other intellectual property fields.
 
59 
“Apart from the very great reputational significance of being seen as 
a credited writer, and its impact on the job prospects of the writer, 
screen credit determines the writer’s share of the copyright’s value in 
the form of separated rights and residual payments.”60
independent producers).” ASSOCIATION OF MOTION PICTURE AND TELEVISION 
PRODUCERS, http://www.amptp.org/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).   
 
57. Fisk, Screen credit, supra note 50 at 216.  For the origin of the right to manage
credits, see WGA, 2008 Writers Guild of America-Alliance of Motion Picture & Television 
Producers Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement, 29, 
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=1610 (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) (Credits for 
Screen Authorship (General)) and Schedules A and B. The website mentions that: “[t]he 
2011 MBA is now in effect. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) may be downloaded 
below, along with the 2008 MBA which the MOA amends. The full text of the 2011 MBA 
will be published and posted in the near future.” Id. 
58. Fisk, supra note 50, at 219. For a comparison between moral rights and screen
credits, see Bayard F. Berman & Sol Rosenthal, Screen Credit and the Law,  9 UCLA L. 
REV. 156, 158 (1962). 
59. Fisk, supra note 50, at 247-48: “[t]he elaborate legal process surrounding credit
determinations distinguish the WGA and Hollywood from any other area of cultural 
production, and are unique in the law. They bring the ideas of the rule of law--uniform 
rules, fairly applied, based on evidence and reasoned argument--to the question of what it 
means to be the author of a story. Unlike other places in both law and culture where 
authorship is taken as a (relatively) easily discernible fact, credit arbitrations treat 
authorship as contestable and as something that can be determined only through a process 
designed and administered by and for Guild writers. Everyone in Hollywood knows that 
credited authorship is, in some sense, a fiction when multiple writers have worked on a 
film, but it is important to writers that it be a legal fiction.” 
60. Fisk, id. at 258.
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The Writers Guild of America-Alliance of Motion Picture & 
Television Producers Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement,61
Article 16 deals with separation of rights.  If a writer is qualified 
for separation of rights (meaning that he wrote an original story)
 
usually referred to as the Minimum Basic Agreement (hereafter 
MBA), covers separated rights and residual payments, which are 
based on screen credits.  Article 13 of the MBA sets the minimal 
compensation (“flat deal”) to be received by a writer for his 
employment, depending on the extent of his contribution and the 
nature of the audiovisual work. 
62
and receives a “Story by,” “Written by,” or “Screen Story by” credit, 
he is entitled to separated rights.  As such, article 16 actually bypasses 
the work made for hire doctrine.  Even though the producer is 
deemed the sole author and owner of the rights, under certain 
conditions detailed in the MBA, the writers can benefit from rights 
such as the right to publish a movie script in whole or in substantial 
part.63
The protection of residuals is another way to circumvent the work 
for hire doctrine.  Residuals are “additional payments to workers for 
the exhibition of an entertainment product in media other than the 
one for which it was originally created, or for its reuse within the 
same medium subsequent to the initial exhibition.  They are 
sometimes called ‘re-use fees’ or “supplemental contributions.” 
 
64  As 
stated by Robert Gilbert, residuals represent extra compensation, in 
addition to basic wages, salaries, or fees.65
61. MBA, supra note 57.
 
62. Id. at 16.A.2, 16.B.1.
63. Id. at 16.A.3.a. Other examples include the right to a production intended to
exploit the dramatic rights in the story, screenplay or motion picture, under certain 
conditions (theatrical motion pictures) or other rights (“reserved rights”) including, but 
not limited to, dramatic, theatrical motion picture, publication, merchandising rights, radio 
rights, live television rights, interactive rights and television sequel rights (television).  Id. 
at 16.A.3.a., 16.B.3. 
64. Alan Paul & Archie Kleingartner, Flexible Production and the Transformation of
Industrial Relations in the Motion Picture and Television Industry, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 663, 669 (1994). See also Robert W. Gilbert, ‘Residual Rights’ Established by 
Collective Bargaining in Television and Radio, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 102 
(1958): “Various talent guild agreements governing the use of recorded or filmed material 
in radio and television normally permit an initial use or cycle of uses in return for basic 
wages, salaries, or fees by participating talent employees, but call for additional 
compensation as a condition precedent to subsequent re-use on successive broadcasts or 
telecasts.” 
65. Gilbert, supra note 64 at 103, adding they can vary according to “their source (i.e., 
whether paid by the original producer of the recording or film, who is the direct employer, 
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Residuals are “more economically significant for most writers 
than are separated rights.”66  “Almost all residuals due on made-for-
theatrical motion pictures are revenue based…The writer is entitled 
to a percentage of the money the project generated from uses other 
than any theatrical exploitation... Residuals due for made-for-
television projects can be both fixed and revenue based.” 67  “Over 
time, residuals became an established feature of the industry and are 
perennially important in collective negotiations.”68  For example, the 
principal issue leading to the 2007-2008 writers strike was the 
question of residuals for new media.69
c. Summary
 
In summary, the default system works as follows:
United States Author Owner 
Exclusive 
copyright for the 
audiovisual work 
The producer 
(works made for hire) 
The producer 
Contract-based 






The physical person 
who authored the 
work 
(based on screen 
credits, under 
certain conditions) 
(not a copyright) 
or by a subsequent purchaser or user who stands in his place) or the time of payment (i.e., 
whether paid in advance, shortly after the talent employee actually performs his services, 
or at a later date, following the specified re-broadcasts or re-uses).” There exist similar 
mechanisms for screen actors and directors.  Id. at 107-109. 
66. Fisk, Screen Credit, supra note 50 at 262-63.
 67. WGA, Residuals Survival Guide, 10, 
http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/writers_resources/residuals/residualssurvival05.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
68. Fisk, Screen Credit, supra note 50, at 262-63.
69. On the 2007-2008 WGA strike, see Carole E. Handler, James D. Nguyen &
Marina Depietri, The WGA Strike : Picketing for a Bigger Piece of the New Media Pie, 25 
ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 2 (2008); Bernadette A. Safrath, How Improvements in Technology 
have Affected the Entertainment Industry: Writers and Actors Fight for Compensation, 26 
TOURO L. REV. 115 (2011). 
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C. A (Really Brief) Conclusion to the Introduction
The American producer of an audiovisual work benefits, in the
United States, from the work made for hire doctrine.  This doctrine 
automatically transfers initial authorship and ownership from writers 
and other creative individuals to producers.  By contrast, France only 
grants producers a presumption of transfer.  In accordance with 
article 14 bis of the Berne Convention, this mechanism transfers 
ownership of certain rights to the producer, even though the creative 
individuals are deemed the initial authors. 
The Berne Convention, which treats foreign authors as national 
authors, also adds that where audiovisual works are concerned, the 
law determining authorship and ownership is the law of the country 
where protection is claimed.  Thus, we concluded that an American 
producer claiming protection in France would not be able to use the 
work made for hire doctrine in that country.  Since there is no such 
mechanism in French law, the producer would only benefit from a 
presumption of transfer of ownership for certain rights. 
However, the wording of the presumption of transfer is very 
specific and does not cover all exploitation rights.  Furthermore, some 
of the rights related to audiovisual works aim specifically at creative 
individuals, thereby excluding producers.  These rights tend to be 
managed through blanket licensing and mandatory collective 
management. 
Finally, we examined the labor environment in the motion picture 
industry to uncover a contractual system of quasi-copyright 
management through guilds.  The guilds use a sophisticated system of 
authorship attribution by screen credits to redistribute compensation 
collectively negotiated for each re-use of audiovisual works. 
II. Anatomy of the Foreign Levies Problem: When
Workarounds Collide 
The French private copying system we discussed earlier is one 
example among many others of a national copyright law granting 
rights to the creator and excluding the producer.  Due to 
discrepancies in copyright laws around the world, it is not uncommon 
for non-American copyright collectives to collect copyright levies on 
behalf of American creators. 
According to article 5 of the Berne Convention on national 
treatment, foreign owners of rights and national authors are treated 
in the same way.  “This principle is upheld by collective management 
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organizations which, under reciprocal representation agreements, 
administer foreign repertoires on their national territory, exchange 
information, and pay royalties to foreign owners of rights.”70
Usually, copyright collectives deal with foreign levies through 
reciprocal bilateral agreements: each society represents the others on 
its own territory, thus offering a blanket license for an international 
repertoire within a single national territory.  In the meantime, the 
other sister-societies license the same repertoire on behalf of the 
others in their respective territories.  For example, music 
performance rights are managed in the United States by ASCAP and 
BMI and in France by SACEM.  SACEM will collect levies for 
American right-holders in France, ASCAP and BMI will collect levies 
for French right-holders in the United States.  Then, the societies will 




Unfortunately, such a system cannot function for motion pictures, 
as there is no American copyright collective dealing with audiovisual 
works.  Therefore, non-American copyright collectives started to 
collect and pile up levies for the creators of audiovisual works without 
being able to transfer the levies to an American counterpart. 
 
A. The Foreign Levies Agreement
It appears that, soon after the United States entered the Berne
Convention, American film and TV producers claimed authors’ 
foreign levies.  The guilds challenged the studios’ claim, “arguing that 
writers and directors were “authors” under foreign law and thus 
entitled to the authors’ share of the foreign levies.”72
Guild vice president Carl Gottlieb, in a posting to a popular 
WGA members’ blog called Writer Action, says the foreign-
levies diversion scheme was originally hatched in 1990 by two 
studio lawyers and then–WGA executive director Brian 
Walton.  According to Gottlieb — and later confirmed by 
  The rest is 
explained by journalist Dennis McDougall: 
70. Collective Management of Copyright and Related Right, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/about_collective_mngt.html 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
71. Mihály Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 17-22
(Geneva: WIPO, 2002). 
72. WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, Foreign Levies Program: Program History,
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=4264 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
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WGA general counsel Tony Segall — attorney Jay Roth (who 
later became DGA executive director and was paid over $1 
million last year) and MCA/Universal general counsel Robert 
Hadl (now on annual WGA retainer at $150,000, plus $300 an 
hour and expenses) came to Walton with a proposition: If they 
could persuade foreign collecting societies to turn over their 
revenue to the WGA, this promising new income stream for 
writers could be shared with the guilds and studios, including 
Hadl’s.  The alternative to the deal was to leave the money 
offshore while fighting a protracted global legal battle with an 
uncertain outcome, which included strong arguments on all 
sides over which contract and national law was applicable,” 
Gottlieb argued.73
The guilds were facing two options.  They could either claim the 
levies by battling through a long, costly and unpredictable lawsuit 
covering several foreign copyright laws, or team up with the 
producers by granting them the lion’s share of the levies in exchange 
for their not interfering with the collection of levies.  The WGA and 
the Directors’ Guild of America
 
74 (hereafter DGA) chose the second 
option and approached non-American copyright collectives, 
“proposing that the guilds disburse that money on behalf of U.S. 
Authors.”75
1. Origin of the Agreement
  This proposition was soon accepted and both guilds 
entered the so-called Foreign Levies Agreement. 
The first five-year agreement gathered the DGA and the WGA
on one side and Columbia Pictures, CPT Holdings, Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Pictures, MGM/United Artists Television Productions, 
Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, United Artists Pictures, 
Universal City Studios, Walt Disney Pictures & Television and 
Warner Bros (hereafter the Producers) on the other side.76
73. Dennis McDougal, Double-Cross at the WGA : If you write for TV or film in
Hollywood, your check might never be in the mail, L.A. WEEKLY (May 3, 2007) 
[hereinafter Double-Cross],  http://www.laweekly.com/content/printVersion/58658/. 
  It covered 
74. DGA, http://www.dga.org/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). For a history of the
creation of the DGA, see Steve Pond, Before the Guild, DGA, 
http://www.dga.org/Craft/DGAQ/All-Articles/1004-Winter-2010-11/Features-Before-the-
Guild.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
75. McDougal, Double Cross,  supra note 74.
76. Foreign Levies Agreement (Jun. 1, 1990) (on file with author).
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rights from “a dozen nations.”77  The problem is the agreement was 
completely unbalanced and favored producers: “In fact, the 
arithmetic wasn’t all that hard, even for a writer, to grasp.  The 
powerful trio divided the booty three ways: 85 percent for the studios, 
7.5 percent for the DGA and 7.5 percent for the WGA…”78
The agreement was accompanied by a set of provisions requiring 
the DGA and the WGA to waive their rights to contest the amount of 
their share (art. 6), and specifying that the guilds would act as 
collecting agencies for the Producers (art. 4 and 6).
 
79  It added that if a 
contract between a Producer and an author was to set a different 
distribution ratio for the royalties, such a contract would either be 
superseded (art. 9) or result in a compensation with previously 
collected levies (art. 7).80  At the same time, the Producers would 
undertake not to include in their standard agreements clauses waiving 
directors’ and/or writer claims to video levies and video rentals (art. 
10).81
The Foreign Levies Agreement has been renegotiated several 
times in subsequent years.  Its latest installment was signed in 2005, 
gathering almost the same players.82  The main difference now is the 
distribution key.  Whereas the DGA and the WGA could only keep 
15% of the Author’s share in 1990, they managed to negotiate 50% of 
the video levies and video levies rentals from 2005 on, to be divided 
between the WGA and the DGA equally.83
2. Non-Members Included
 
But the leonine distribution key is not the only element of
concern of this agreement.  In addition to transferring a 
disproportionate amount of the royalties to the Producers, both guilds 
77. Dennis McDougal, For Hollywood Writers, a Whiff of Unclaimed Foreign Gold,
THE N.Y. TIMES (September 19, 2005) [hereinafter Unclaimed Gold], 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/19/business/media/19guild.html?_r=0 . In 1998, most of 
the sums came from Germany and France, see WGA, 1998 WGA Annual Report to 
Writers, 11 (June 30, 2008)  
http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/who_we_are/annual_reports/Annual%20Report%2098.
pdf [hereinafter 1998 Annual Report]. 
78. McDougal, Double-Cross, supra note 73.
79. 1990 Foreign Levies Agreement (Jun. 1, 1990) (on file with author).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. With the addition of Warner Bros. Television Production.
83. 2005 Foreign Levies Agreement (Sept. 1, 2005) (one file with author).  This
agreement will expire at the end of 2014. 
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accepted responsibility for the levies of all American creators, 
regardless of their status vis-a-vis the guilds:  
Part of the “detail” that the WGA board... apparently 
wanted to spare writers in 1990 was a prescient 
indemnification clause, which foreign collecting societies 
forced the WGA to include with each pact.  The clause held 
the guild liable in the event that any author due foreign levies 
decided to sue one of the three entities over the deal Roth, 
Hadl and Walton had cut.84
A quick glance at the guilds jurisdiction could be useful at this 
point.  Programs such as independent movies (by definition), 
animation,
 
85 or reality TV shows86 – even the very profitable adult-
entertainment film industry87 – are not covered by WGA or DGA 
collective agreements.  This, however, did not prevent the guilds from 
collecting levies ultimately pertaining to non-members.  In practice, 
foreign levies were treated as residuals.88  Furthermore, the WGA 
imposed a fee of 5% of the gross amount of residuals paid to all non-
members,89
84. McDougal, Double-Cross, supra note 73.
 and collected $863,749 in administrative fees in 2011 to 
85. ANIMATION GUILD, http://animationguild.org/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). For a
history of the Animation Guild, see ANIMATION GUILD, Guild History, 
http://animationguild.org/guild-history/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
86. Daniel J. Blau, The WGA already lost Round 1: A survivor of a little-noticed 2006
guild strike has seen this script before, L.A. TIMES (November 20, 2007),  
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/20/news/OE-BLAU20; Dave McNary, WGA gives up 
on nonscripted effort: Guild won’t move forward in reality rumble, VARIETY (October 23, 
2007), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117974582?refCatId=10. 
87. On the lack of collective agreements in the adult entertainment industry, see
Holly J. Wilmet, Naked Feminism: The Unionization of the Adult Entertainment Industry, 
7 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 466 (1998): “Not only are adult entertainers 
appropriate for union organization, but they want to be organized. Nevertheless, 
organized labor has all but turned its back to the exotic dancers and pornographic movie 
actors seeking assistance in securing minimum wages, benefits and job security.” It is 
worth mentioning that the Screen Actors Guild, which does not include performers in 
adult movies, concluded an agreement similar to the Foreign Levies Agreement covering 
performers’ neighbouring rights. The Screen Actors Guild was sued by actor Ken Osmond 
and proceeded to settle in 2011, just as the WGA and the DGA did. 
88. Residuals Survivor Guide, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, 48 (2005), 
http://www.wga.org/subpage_writersresources.aspx?id=133. 
89. Id. at 52: “The Guild administers the residuals provisions of the MBA not only on
behalf of its members, but also for the benefit of non-members and the beneficiaries of deceased 
writers. The Guild’s enforcement efforts are multi-faceted and include processing of residuals 
checks, pursuing claims for unpaid residuals, processing documentation necessary for 
beneficiaries to receive the residual payments, monitoring the status of probate matters, and, in 
some cases, acting as the beneficiary representative by receiving the residuals and issuing checks 
to multiple beneficiaries.” 
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offset the expenses of negotiating and administering the foreign levies 
program.90
Levies were distributed to some of the non members at least from 
2005 on.
 
91  In 2007, the WGA was holding $20.6 million in trust, 
pending identification of the writers.92  To get a better sense of the 
extent of the services rendered to non members, a quick search of the 
DGA website is helpful.  Apparently, the DGA is unable to locate 
people like 1999 Academy Award winner Roberto Benigni (Life is 
Beautiful).93  A visit to the WGA website also revealed that they were 
unable to locate 2010 Palme d’Or Nominee Jacques Audiard (A 
Prophet).94
3. On the Guilds’ Decision Process
 
The last but not least troubling element is that the Guilds‘
members were kept completely out of the negotiation of the Foreign 
Levies Agreement.  Once again, in the words of Dennis McDougal: 
According to Gottlieb and Segall, Walton informed the WGA 
board what he had done — but there was never a board vote 
on the matter.  Nor were the pacts that the WGA negotiated 
with each foreign collecting society and the Hollywood studios 
90. Annual Financial Report, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., 11 (2011),
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=4877.  The WGA collected $977,390 in 2010, see 
Annual Financial Report, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., 11 (2010), 
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=4651, $539,934 in 2009, see Annual Financial 
Report, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., 11 (2009), 
http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/who_we_are/annual_reports/annreport09.pdf, and $950,624 in 
2008, see Annual Financial Report, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., 12 (2008), 
http://www.wga.org/subpage_whoweare.aspx?id=3716. 
91. 2006 WGA Annual Report to Writers, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., (June 
10, 2006), http://www.wga.org/subpage_whoweare.aspx?id=2394: “For a second year, we 
distributed almost $8 million in foreign levies to our member writers (East and West), heirs and 
beneficiaries of deceased members, and non-member writers of animation and nonfiction. 
Undeliverable funds reached $7.2 million by the end of the fiscal year. This money is in two main 
categories—residuals and clip payments due to writers who cannot be located; and foreign levies 
monies held for more than seven years.” The 1998 annual report mentions that foreign levies 
were distributed before 1998, without precising whether non-members were included in the 
distribution. see 1998 WGA Annual Report to Writers, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, 
INC., 11 (1998),  http://www.wga.org/subpage_whoweare.aspx?id=336, supra note 77.  
92. 2007 WGAW Annual Report to Writers, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., 20
(2007), http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/who_we_are/annual_reports/marketplace07.pdf. 
93. Foreign Levies / Non-Member Directors, DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA,
http://www.dga.org/ForeignLevies/NonMemberDirectors.aspx (last visited May 2012). 
94. Foreign Levies Program, Search by Writers Name, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, 
WEST, https://my.wgaw.org/flslookup/SearchbyName.aspx (last visited May 2012). 
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ever submitted to guild members.  Further, no one among the 
WGA hierarchy explained to member writers — or 
nonmembers — what they had done.95 
It appears that most guilds’ members were unaware of the 
existence of the foreign levies.  Here, the guilds seem to have failed in 
their duty to keep their members informed.  Considering that 
residuals are a significant source of income for guild members, it is 
astonishing they failed to consult their members on such an important 
issue.  All the more, they lacked legitimacy to deal with non-
members’ royalties—we will come back to this point later in this 
article. 
B. The Class-Action Suits
Predictably, the situation turned sour after several years.  As the
foreign levies were closely intertwined with the complex residuals 
system, it is not surprising that the first people to notice there was a 
problem were non-guild members.  In contrast to guild members, who 
could receive residual checks including foreign levies, non-guild 
members were not receiving any compensations from abroad.  Upon 
learning that he was owed royalties by the WGA, non-WGA member 
William Richert “filed suit against the guild in Superior Court in Los 
Angeles, seeking class-action status and contending, among other 
things, that the union had fraudulently collected and kept money 
intended for others.”96
1. The WGA and DGA Class-Actions
  His example was soon followed by non-DGA 
member William Webb, who sued the DGA. 
When the guilds asked for both cases to be transferred to a
federal court, they were treated jointly.97  Interestingly, Richert and 
Webb did not claim that the WGA and the DGA had failed their 
obligation to redistribute levies collected through the Foreign Levies 
Agreement.  They instead argued that the Guilds had no right to 
collect the levies in the first place.98
95. McDougal, Double-Cross, supra note 73.
 
96. McDougal, Unclaimed Gold, supra note 77.
97. Webb v. Dirs. Guild of Am.,Inc., No. CV05-08257, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96633,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2007). 
98. Id. at *18, *21-22.
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On the contrary, the WGA and the DGA relied on the labor 
dimension of the dispute.99  The WGA and DGA argued that the 
plaintiff’s right to compensation was created by the Foreign Levies 
Agreement and not by foreign copyright laws.100  In their view, the 
Foreign Levies Agreement is a collective contract triggering the 
application of labor law rules and the jurisdiction of Federal courts.101 
But the judge considered that “…the existence, nature, and scope of 
the right asserted by plaintiffs is independent of the Foreign Levy 
Agreement.”102  The court then noted that “state law claims are not 
preempted if they are based on rights that exist independent of a 
labor contract,”103
Then, the Court proceeded to determine whether the Foreign 
Levies Agreement restricted in any ways the plaintiff’s rights and 
noted that “[b]y providing that the Guilds would receive less than 100 
percent of the author’s share, the Agreement clearly limited plaintiffs’ 
right to receive their full share of the foreign levies.”
 to conclude that the California court maintained 
jurisdiction over the matter. 
104 The court 
therefore concluded that the Agreement contained “clear and 
unmistakable language circumscribing plaintiffs’ rights.”105  The case 
was therefore remanded to the Los Angeles Superior Court.106
2. The Settlements
 
Upon the granting of the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case,
the DGA and William Webb decided to negotiate a settlement and 
filed a motion for approval, which was granted on September 10, 
2008. 107   The final settlement class only encompasses non-DGA 
directors.108  The DGA undertook to conduct an annual review of its 
foreign levies program from 2006 on, under certain conditions.109
99. Id. at *10-11.
  The 
guild also undertook to publish a notice of class-action settlement 
100. Id. at *20.
101. Id. at *10-11.
102. Id. at *23.
103. Id. at *23.
104. Id. at *30.
105. Id. at *30.
106. Id. at *53.
107. Order and J. Granting Joint Appl. Final Approval Class Action Settlement at 1
Webb v. Dirs. Guild of Am., Inc., No. BC35262, (2006). 
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 1.
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through its website and several publications. 110   The DGA was 
allowed to charge a maximum fee of ten percent to be collected on 
interests generated by the sums owed to non-members, and 
supplementary fees if necessary.111  In addition to this fee, the DGA 
was able to retain the interests generated by the sums in custody.112  If 
the DGA’s efforts proved to be unsuccessful, funds for non-members 
that could not be distributed within two years would be transferred to 
a charity, the Motion Picture & Television fund.113
Soon afterwards, the WGA and William Richert negotiated a 
settlement and filed a motion for approval, which was granted on 
June 2, 2010.
 
114  The settlement class encompasses all writers, WGA 
and non-WGA members alike, whose works earned funds paid to the 
WGA by foreign collection societies.115  The WGA agreed to have its 
Foreign Levies Program audited from its inception and evaluated 
each year from now on.116  The guild also undertook to publish a 
notice of class-action settlement through its website and several 
publications.117  It was able to continue to administrate foreign levies 
and allowed to charge a maximum fee of ten percent, to be collected 
on interests generated by the sums and administrative fees. 118 
However, the reasonableness of the amount of the fee will be 
assessed in comparison with similar organizations, including the 
Canadian Screenwriters Collection Society, ASCAP, and BMI.119
III. Accountability for Intermediaries in Collective Copyright
Issues 
 
Both settlements are the result of a collision.  They are the 
judicial by-products of a clash between an industry-negotiated 
copyright workaround and a legislative tweak to an otherwise 
110. Id. at 8. See also Foreign Levies, DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA,
http://www.dga.org/ForeignLevies.aspx, (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
111. Order and J. Granting Joint Appl., supra note 107, at 4-5.
112. Id. at 4.
113. Id. at 8.
114. J. and Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement at 1, Richert v.
Writers Guild of Am. West, No. BC339972 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2010). 
115. Id. at Exhibit A at 2.
116. Id. at Exhibit A at 2-4.
117. Notice of Final Settlement, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST,
http://www.wga.org/uploadedfiles/foreign_levies/WGAForeignLevies.pdf. 
118. WGA Settlement Approval, supra note 114 at Exhibit A at 6.
119. Id.
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unworkable droit d’auteur system.  They express a desperate need for 
a more practical approach to copyright. 
As an answer, Cohen, who developed a research agenda on 
copyright as post-industrial property,120 calls for a change in the most 
current theoretical assumptions of copyright’s purpose.  To 
counteract what she calls the “incentives-for-authors rationale,”121 she 
proposes to compare copyright with corporate property.122  More 
precisely, she suggests to quit the property-based approach of solving 
problems through entitlement limitations and to consider copyright in 
more “explicitly regulatory and relational” ways.123
She is of the opinion that we should treat “copyright as a distinct, 
post-industrial modality of property governance.”
 
124
A. Compensation Systems: Workarounds and Copyright Governance
  In other words, 
considering copyright’s relational aspects could help us overcome 
both the “copyright as property” rhetoric and debate.  From there, we 
could focus on the stake-holders’ relationships in copyright-based 
industries.  More specifically, we could take copyright as a 
governance framework enabling interactions among different sets of 
stake-holders—authors, producers and collective intermediaries.  The 
remainder of this paper will use her theoretical work as a framework 
for a reflection on collective intermediaries’ place in the 
cinematographic industry. 
1. Residuals and Private Copying as Rewards for Creative Capital
Let’s go back to the Foreign Levies Agreement for a moment.
This agreement is a bridge between two systems that undermine the 
fundamentals of copyright law.  On the one side, the French system 
breaks down copyright’s exclusive nature to compensate authors.  
Practically, the private copying mechanism turns copyright into 
something that looks closely like a quasi-neighboring right for 
authors.  On the other side of the Atlantic, industry-wide collective 
agreements construct a contractual right to compensation for 
120. Cohen, supra note 2, at 149.
121. Id. at 142.
122. Id. at 144.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 156.
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copyright reuse.  Here again, the right granted to guilds’ members 
looks closely like performers’ neighboring rights.125
As noticed by Cohen, “[n]eighboring rights laws respond to the 
reality of capital-intensive creative industries by enabling those 
industries to acquire the rights they need to plan and sustain their 
operations.”
 
126  The French private copying compensation127
As such, they are an important part of a copyright governance 
system that considers creative capital owners as important stake-
holders.  In fact, both private copying and residuals are a way to 
separate right to compensation from control, along lines similar to 
those separating corporate ownership from corporate control.  As 
Cohen puts it: “[T]he existence of complex regimes of neighboring 
rights in authors’ rights regimes reinforces the notion that a regime of 
copyright/authors’ rights does not concern solely the rights of authors 
or of intermediaries, but rather the nature of the relationship between 
authors and intermediaries.”
 and the 
American residuals system are an answer to the needs of the 
cinematographic industry.  But they have one more purpose: both 
article L. 311-1 C.P.I. on private copying and the WGA’s MBA 
specifically encompass physical persons.  Both insist on rewarding 
human and creative resources. 
128
Copyright as a governance system highlights the nature of the 
relationship between financial capital and creative capital.  Instead of 
insisting on the nature and scope of authors’ rights, copyright and 
workaround mechanisms ensure an adequate compensation for the 
creation of immaterial property.  By stepping in, copyright 
intermediaries level the playing field and enable a negotiation at 
arm’s length between two categories of stake-holders: authors and 
producers. 
2. Copyright Intermediaries as Stake-Holders
But authors as stake-holders have a somewhat hybrid status.
Their individual relationships within cultural industries often present 
125. Craig Mazin, Residual rumble: We’re standing up for all rank-and-file,  L.A. 
TIMES, December 12, 2007, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-op-
dustup12dec12,0,5202647.story, speaking of the residuals: “They are our version of 
royalties, and they are an integral byproduct of our authorship.” 
126. Cohen, supra note 2, at 155.
127. It may be useful to remember here that the French private copying system,
namely article L 311-7 C.P.I. also grants producers one third of all private copying levies. 
128. Cohen, supra note 2, at 156.
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many of the characteristics of a labor relationship.  Such a situation 
supports American artists’ choice to unionize and French authors’ 
decision to create copyright collectives.  But their collective action 
presents a very different aspect.  Both the SACD and the WGA 
negotiate large scale deals granting access to a pool of creative 
resources.  SACD does so directly by granting repertoire licenses on 
creative content.  The WGA does so by framing producers’ access to 
creators.  In that respect, unions and copyright collectives act as 
capital owners, trying to get the best out of their assets.  In this 
context, authors consequently “perform a role analogous to the 
shareholders’ role.”129
The Foreign Levies Agreement illustrates the shortcomings of 
this situation.  When negotiating with the producers, the guilds 
privileged their functions as capital managers.  The same can be said 
of the foreign copyright collectives who ditched foreign right-holders’ 
levies to the guilds without much concern about their ability or 
willingness to fulfill the task.  The interest of the structures took over 
their members’ interest. 
 
Thomas Paris considers that collective management of copyright 
revolves around three different logics 130  and his findings can be 
extended to the American artists unions.  His belief is that there are 
three groups of interest at play within collective copyright 
intermediaries: an administrative structure, an institutional structure, 
and a right-holders’ structure.131
The administrative structure will act to maintain its own existence, 
by increasing the number of employees, the volume of activities, and 
the amount of the fees.
 
132
129. Id. at 160.
  The institutional structure will make of the 
collective an inescapable intermediary, for example by extending the 
collective’s jurisdiction, lobbying around, and starting costly 
130. Thomas Paris, L’organisation de la gestion collective des droits d’auteur : entre
rationalisation et logique d’institution [The Organization of Collective Management of 
Copyright: From Rationalization and Logic Institution] 16:88 RÉSEAUX 123, 132 (1998). 
131. Id. at 132.  See also Fabrice Rochelandet, Are Copyright Collecting Societies
Efficient Organisations? An Evaluation of Collective Administration of Copyright in 
Europe, in THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT:  DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND 
ANALYSIS, 178-181 (Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt, eds. 2003). 
132. For example, the WGA created a 5% management fee on residuals to non-
members in 2006, while maintaining a 1.5% fee for members, see Writers Guild of 
America, Residuals Guide, supra note 88, at 52. 
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lawsuits.133  Finally, the right-holders’ structure will try to maximize 
their profits by closely monitoring the amount of the fees, negotiating 
more leeway for contracting out of the system, and discussing the 
scope of social programs.134
The Foreign Levies Agreement can be understood as a meeting of 
both administrative and institutional structures, to the detriment of 
the right-holders’ structure.  The WGA’s administrative structure of 
the time decided not to jeopardize its current position by entering 
long-term, costly, highly risky litigation, which would not bear fruit 
during its mandate.  The SACD’s institutional structure thought it 
best to forge a new bilateral agreement to channel out foreign levies.  
That way, it could boast about its efficiency while strengthening its 
position as an essential intermediary. 
 
B. Settlements Blurring the Accountability Line
Thus, collective copyright intermediaries are prone to favor their
own interests over those of authors and “this tendency requires 
appropriate structural correction.”135
This is yet another instance of the seemingly increasing use of 
class-action settlements to deal with thorny copyright issues.
 But such structural remedies 
cannot be found in copyright law.  Instead, in this case, the parties 
spontaneously solved their dispute outside court. 
136  Where 
laws have a chilling effect, parties seek an escape through litigation. 
One can wonder to which extent the solution is worse than the 
problem.  Class-actions typically generate coordination issues among 
the class-members, and in the case of the Guilds, leave very little 
wiggle room for uninformed non-guild members.  They are, at best, a 
“better than none” solution.137
133. WGA’s attempt to unionize reality TV writers in order to enhance the effects of
its 2007 strike is a good example of that logic, see Blau, supra note 86 and McNary, supra 
note 86. Had the guild been successful, the producers would have run short of any fresh 
content in a very short while after the beginning of the strike. See also The show will 
resume : Striking writers go back to their desks, THE ECONOMIST, 12 February 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/node/10677757 precising: “[t]hey also gave up trying to get reality 
television and animation covered by union terms.  That is important: being able to fill 
holes with reality shows protected the media companies financially during the strike.” 
  In fact, the use of settlement as a 
regulation tool is problematic on several levels. 
134. Paris, supra note 130, at 132.
135. Id. at 161.
136. C. Scott Hemphill, Collusive and Exclusive Settlements of Intellectual Property
Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 685, 688 (2010). 
137. Id. at 695.
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1. Settlement v. Escheat
A closer look at the DGA settlement tells us that the DGA will
keep undeliverable money for two years only, keep the interest 
generated by the funds in custody, charge a management fee in 
addition to keeping the interests, and transfer undeliverable funds to 
a charity after two years.   The WGA settlement provides that the 
guild will keep the money until declared undeliverable, discuss in 
good faith the definition and fate of undeliverable funds, transfer 
levies whose owner cannot be located to the State of California, and 
transfer levies whose owner cannot be identified to a charity.138
But an examination of California’s Unclaimed Property Law
 
139 
tells us that the guilds are business associations140 who hold residuals 
in a fiduciary capacity,141 consequently falling under its scope.  This 
act provides that any property held by a third-party for more than 
seven years should revert to the State, to be kept until its rightful 
owner claims it.  The Unclaimed Property Act is a law established for 
public policy reasons: the right to escheat cannot be waived by private 
agreement.142  Consequently, no Screen Actors Guild by-laws can 
prevent residuals held for more than seven years to escheat to the 
State of California, as stated by Screen Actors Guild, Inc. v. Cory.143
Both settlements are problematic in several regards.  First, the 
DGA settlement stipulates that undeliverable funds will be 
transferred to a charity after two years.  It circumvents escheat by 
incorporating provisions that would be prohibited in a guild by-law.  
 
In this decision, the court confirmed that funds retained by a guild for 
more than seven years should escheat to the State of California, even 
though the Screen Actors Guild by-law stated that residuals 
unclaimed for at least six years would revert to the guild for the 
benefit of all of its members. 
138. See infra, II. B. 2.
139. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code §§ 1500-1599 (2012).
140. Id. §1501 (c).
141. Id. §1518 (a).
142. Cal. Civ. Code §3513 (2012): “Any one may waive the advantage of a law
intended solely for his benefit.  But a law established for a public reason cannot be 
contravened by a private agreement.” Guilds’ by-laws are considered as private 
agreements. 
143. Screen Actors Guild, Inc. v. Cory, 91 Cal. App. 3d 111, 154 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.
1979).  The Screen Actors Guild appealed from a declaratory judgment decreeing that 
residuals held by it on behalf of its members and pursuant to a specific by-law were subject 
to escheat to the State of California after seven years. The judgment under appeal was 
affirmed.  Id. 
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Furthermore, considering that the levies have been held since the 
early 1990s, two years is a very short delay for directors to track their 
dues.  Second, when the money escheat to the State, it remains under 
the State Controller’s custody, 144  who is entitled to retain the 
interest,145 but cannot charge any fee.146  On the contrary, both guilds 
are allowed to retain a ten percent fee on foreign levies.147  Thus, 
authors whose levies have been held for more than seven years 
already are in a worse situation than if the settlements had not taken 
place.  Third, the State of California built an online searchable 
database that allows anyone to look for unclaimed property and to 
determine the exact amount held in custody and the origin of the 
amount.148  On the contrary, both DGA and WGA websites do not 
provide the amounts held in custody.  Currently, the DGA 
distinguishes between people owed $25 to $49.99 and people owed 
more than $50. 149  The WGA does not provide any information 
regarding the amounts.150
In Screen Actors Guild, Inc. v. Cory,
  The settlements actually make it more 
difficult for authors to know the exact amounts they are entitled to 
receive. 
151
In this respect [the Screen Actors Guild] may do a 
better job than the state because its search for such 
persons is more industry-oriented and more prolonged. 
It also appears that plaintiff provides a better interest 
return on these residuals than the state does.
 the court made two 
interesting comments: 
152
144. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1560(a).
145. Id. §1562.  The interest is transferred to the State’s General Fund.
146. Id. §1522: “No service, handling, maintenance or other charge or fee of any kind
which is imposed because of the inactive or unclaimed status contemplated by this chapter, 
may be deducted or withheld from any property subject to escheat under this chapter, 
unless specifically permitted by this chapter.” 
147. For the DGA fee collected in addition to interests, see infra note 149. For the
WGA fee, see infra note 150. 
148. Unclaimed Property Search, CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE (Sept.
24, 2012), http://scoweb.sco.ca.gov/UCP/Default.aspx. 
 149. Non Members Directors, DIRECTORS GUILD OF AMERICA, 
http://www.dga.org/ForeignLevies/NonMemberDirectors.aspx (last visited on Oct. 5, 
2012). 
150. WGAW Foreign Levies Program, WGA, 
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=4262 (last visited on Oct. 5, 2012). 
151. Cory, supra note 143, at 113.
152. Id. at 116 n.5.
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[The Screen Actors Guild] undoubtedly does occupy 
a different relationship to its members and they to each 
other than ordinarily obtains between and among 
holders and owners of unclaimed property.  The 
Legislature may wish to make this circumstance the 
basis for a special exemption of the unclaimed residuals 
at issue, but in our view it has not accomplished this 
exemption in the present wording of the statute.153
In sum, neither the guild’s by-laws, nor their supposed efficiency 
should prevent the money held in custody to escheat, as long as guilds 
fall under the scope of the Unclaimed Property Law.
 
154
2. A Quasi-Legislative Outcome
  By granting 
the settlements, the Los Angeles’ courts have achieved a “quasi-
legislative” outcome regarding unclaimed levies. 
Pamela Samuelson recently used the expression “quasi-
legislative”155 to qualify a copyright settlement which, “if approved, 
would have accomplished changes that would be tantamount to 
legislative reform.” 156   Such settlements address problems that 
theoretically should not be solved by courts: “[w]hile a legislative 
solution to some of these problems might be possible…it may be 
unlikely to occur for various reasons, including because rights 
allocations are generally matters of contract interpretation.”157
At last, even though the class obtained compensation for the 
levies that were unduly collected by the guilds, both settlements 
created a de facto mandatory system of collective management for 
audiovisual works.  Non-members are now stuck in a system of 
collection over which they have no control.  They have no way to 
participate in the guilds’ decision process and the external control is 
left in the hands of accounting firms in charge of the yearly audits. 
 
In fact, by creating a mutual collection scheme, the WGA-DGA 
settlements “change some substantive default rules of copyright law 
and [have] substantial spillover effects for third parties not 
represented in the settlement negotiations.”158
153. Id. at 116 n.6.
  This outcome is similar 
154. Civ. Proc. §§1500-1599.
155. Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. 
L. REV. 479, 479 (2011).
156. Id. at 515.
157. Id. at 501.
158. Id. at 515.
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the tentative Google Book Settlement in many regards.  In both 
cases, the litigation and settlement project were prompted by unclear 
ownership on certain rights159 and a guild more inclined to settle than 
to continue a “full-dress” suit, 160
Worse, the WGA-DGA settlements do not even address the 
question of ownership of the foreign levies which brought up the 
class-actions in the first place.  The rights will remain unclear.  
Furthermore, the settlements ensure the continued existence of a 
distribution key for foreign levies that no one is even sure is right.  If 
they bring predictability, it is at the cost of fairness. 
 and both are akin to copyright 
reform. 
Finally, the settlements are no answer to the larger problem of the 
accountability of copyright intermediaries.  They impact the nature 
and management of copyright, but they do not question the 
behaviour or internal governance mechanisms for guilds and 
copyright collectives.  The only concession made to transparency is 
the annual intervention of exterior accounting firms, which may, or 
may not, enable members and non-members to challenge the 
practices of guilds and copyright collectives.  That way, settlements 
cannot be considered as a relevant tool for copyright governance. 
IV. Conclusion
Whether of contractual or legislative origin, copyright 
workarounds aim at ensuring direct compensation for creative 
people.  They specifically target physical persons, by granting them a 
fair share of profits.  They reward creative input, sometimes outside 
of the copyright field.  Unfortunately, copyright workarounds are 
devised at the national level.  Accordingly, they are submitted to the 
interference of international copyright conventions.  Thus, when 
workarounds based on drastically different national laws collide, 
turmoil in international exploitation is inevitable.  Agreements such 
as the Foreign Levies Agreement embody the Berne Convention’s 
systemic failure to harmonize the protection regimens for audiovisual 
works.  They are proof that one workaround system can be the 
demise of another.  They illustrate the limits of copyright 
intermediation in capital intensive domains such as the 
cinematographic industry. 
159. Id. at 498-502.
160. Id. at 512-14, specifically at 513.
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Developed in the absence of other structural remedies, national 
settlements are a less than ideal tool to solve the problem.  The 
situation now calls for an inquiry into potential sources of 
accountability for copyright intermediaries. 
